NOTES FROM THE FIELD

Falkland Islands Demining Pilot
Project: Completion of Phase 1
The United Kingdom has started to remove anti-personnel mines from the Falkland/Malvinas
Islands1 in order to meet its obligations under Article 5 of the Ottawa Convention. A pilot phase
was completed in June 2010 to clear four suspected hazardous areas—a critical first step to
inform future projects following the conclusion of the Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study.
by Robin Swanson [ Biron Associates Ltd. ]

A

n article in the 14.1 issue of The Journal of ERW
and Mine Action made some observations
about the completion status of the Falkland
Islands Demining Program. 2 This article aims to articulate the program’s objectives, the problems encountered and methodologies used, and to draw on some of
the key lessons learned from the experience.

tic, minimum-metal mines, which present a challenge
for conventional metal-detection technologies due to
the exceptionally small quantities of metal within the
mines. Some of the SHAs had been subjected to BL 755
cluster-munitions strikes, but because of their high
metallic content, these did not present the same level of
technical challenge to detect.

Objectives

Clearance Methodologies Used

The program’s objectives were twofold: to conduct a
pilot clearance program to meet the requirements of Article 5 obligations and to inform future projects about
clearance challenges. For this reason, the U.K. government selected four suspected hazardous areas in close
consultation with the Falkland Islands government,
which would provide different types of terrain and different mine and unexploded-ordnance threats—two
SHAs near Stanley were known minefields (Surf Bay and
Sapper Hill), and accurate minefield documents were
held for them, while the ones in Goose Green and Fox
Bay East had a less well-defined threat. The U.K. government set standards in excess of International Mine
Action Standards by demanding a 200-millimeter (7.87
inches) contract depth for the clearance of mine panels. In addition, mines affected by the formation of sand
dunes required excavation 300 millimeters (11.81 inches) below the 1982 profile. These increased standards
were designed to address concerns within the island
community about the ability of a mine-clearance program to remove all of the explosive hazards.

Modern metal-detection equipment struggled to detect the minimum-metal mines to the contract depth.
Therefore, the demining contractor BACTEC International Ltd. used layered and full excavation techniques,
depending on the expected mine threat, to meet the
contract’s requirements. The mines had been laid in a
very formal pattern using cord and markers at intervals, and the documents recording the two minefields
near Stanley soon proved to be credible records of the
mine pattern.4 Therefore, once rows were encountered,
the mine patterns could be followed and fully exploited using excavation techniques. This is a slow and demanding method of clearance in normal circumstances,
but additional external factors exacerbated the situation
further. During austral summer 2009–10, the Island recorded the worst weather patterns on record, with conditions including cold high winds, rain, sleet and snow.
Additionally, much of the contaminated ground consisted of thick, fibrous peat and heavy vegetation, which
was difficult to cut. This challenged the deminers5 to
draw on exceptional levels of patience, skill, good humor, and sheer grit and determination.
The Surf Bay Minefield was the most challenging
task. The dense, mixed minefield contained more than
1,000 mines (SB33 & SB81) within a relatively small area
of 3.34 hectares (8.25 acres), and the terrain also varied

The Threat

The Joint U.K.-Argentine Feasibility Study3 identified the different types of landmines encountered on
the islands. The majority of minefields contain plas-
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been excavated and where the mines
were located, was absolutely essential to ensure efficient use of time
and resources. Fortunately, the Public Works Department on the Islands
had access to Real Time Kinematic
Survey7 and its survey team supported the minefield mapping process
very effectively.
Where the threat was less welldefined at Goose Green and Fox Bay,
traditional non-technical and technical survey procedures were adopted. Much information still exists
within the Falkland Islands local
and military community and among
military veterans concerning the
events that took place during and
immediately after the 1982 conflict.
Fortunately for this pilot project,
quality information was available.
This may not be the case for many
other areas where the minefield documents and records do not exist,
and as time goes on, memories will
fade, and key witnesses will be harder to track and interview.
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The Environment

Fully excavating the access lanes on Sapper Hill before the first P4Bs were encountered.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot, DPO Technical Adviser

within it. The local airport road bisected the minefield with deep peat
to the west and gradually thinner
peat and sandier terrain toward the
beach on the east. Six mixed mine
panels6 straddled a previous track in
sandy soil in the minefield’s northeast part where sand accumulation demanded manual excavation
of 400 millimeters (15.74 inches).
Two further panels, consisting of 16
anti-vehicle mines each, had been
covered by large sand dunes since
1982. Conflict-aerial photography
revealed that the mines had been

laid at the current beach level, which
was marked by a cobbled layer of
stone, but the sand dunes were between two and five meters (7–16 feet)
above that level. After initially identifying the start of the first panel using manual excavation techniques, it
then became a mechanical clearance
task routinely operating in four to
five meters (13–16 feet) of sand.
Finding mines at these depths required systematic search procedures.
One early lesson learned was that a
detailed, centimeter-accurate survey,
used to establish exactly what had

Concerns about the project’s environmental impact were raised before it began and were a particular
issue for the Falkland Islands government. The Planning Permission
and consent provided by the FI government required submission of an
acceptable ground remediation plan
with each SHA Clearance Plan and
that steps were taken to educate the
deminers in the identification of
rare plant species expected in the
area. The Clearance Plans divided
the cleared areas into three parts:
1. One area is left to recover naturally.
2. One area has the cut vegetation
replaced so seeds from the cuttings can drop and germinate.
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Armored excavator searching for the SB81 mines at the 1982 profile within the Surf Bay Sand Dunes.

The sand was replaced in a manner to provide relief for natural forces to operate.

Photo courtesy of the author

Photo courtesy of Josephine Swanson

3.

One area is left for a different
approach to be specified using
natural and introduced methods. A broad plan was developed to satisfy these planning
conditions.
Perfectly rebuilding the sand
dunes was never an aspiration, but
in close cooperation with the Environmental Planning Department,
BACTEC replaced the sand to the
best of their abilities, stabilizing the
dunes’ bases where possible using
geo-textiles and aggregate bags. The
area was left deliberately unsmooth
in order to provide relief for natural
forces to work on and to catch drifting seeds for germination purposes.
Monitoring will take place over
the next two years to establish the
most effective approach for future
programs; not only does it need to
be environmentally acceptable, it
needs to be a practical, relatively
simple and cost-effective procedure.
These additional planning require-

52

ments are not always associated with
mine-action programs and provided
different challenges which required
close liaison with local environmental bodies.
Although the tender document
had been written to discourage the
use of specialist mechanical systems, at the end of the process, the
final result was visually not dissimilar to what might have resulted from
a mechanical approach without the
advantages of immediate re-germination when earth is processed and
seeds are reintroduced immediate-

ly. As a result of the pilot program,
these alternative approaches may be
considered during follow-up phases.
Results

The following table represents the
areas actually cleared (including additional battle-area clearance tasks
associated with the four SHAs) and
records the mines and UXO located between 3 December 2009 and 4
June 2010:
In order to place this into context, it is useful to note that Argentina10 declared to the United Nations

SHA

AP Mines

AV Mines

Surf Bay SA-008

488 SB33

568 SB81

-

-

Surf Bay BAC
(Canache Wet Area)
Sapper Hil SA-025
Sapper Hill BAC8
(BL755 Strike Area)
Goose Green GG-011
Fox Bay FB-008W
Fox Bay BAC (Headland Area)
Total

190 P4B

-

UXO
1 M67 Grenade +
7.62mm ammo
4 M67 Grenades
+ 7.62 ammo
-

-

-

-

6.29 Ha

-

-

-

2.41 Ha
2.3 Ha

-

-

-

1.99 Ha9

678

568

8 UXO + 7.62mm
ammo

20.54 Ha

Summary of areas cleared.
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Area Cleared
3.34 Ha
3.44 Ha
0.77 Ha

that it brought 25,000 landmines to the Falkland Islands at the start of the conflict (20,000 anti-personnel
and 5,000 anti-vehicle mines) and that some 5,000 have
been accounted for since the conflict ended. This means
that approximately 20,000 landmines remained in the
ground prior to Phase 1 clearance and that this program cleared more than 6 percent of the remaining
mine contamination.
Confidence Building

An important part of any demining program is instilling confidence within the local community. On
arrival, the Demining Programme Office11 needed to
reassure the community that all the mines could be removed from the areas selected, and to address a widely-held community view that the money could be better
spent removing mines in other parts of the world. While
this may be an honorable stance, the United Kingdom
has an international obligation to clear the landmines in
the Falkland Islands; therefore, the money for the Phase 1
program was allocated separately from the donations the
United Kingdom provided for other international mineaction projects.
The Falkland Islands government was also concerned
about the risk of injury to deminers when local demand
to clear the minefields was nonexistent, no civilian injuries were sustained, and the minefields posed no human-

itarian, social or economic impact to the community.
Fortunately, no one sustained injuries during the program, which can be attributed to good procedures, correct protective equipment and a strong ethos for safety
adopted by BACTEC and the DPO.
The FI government and the local community were
also influenced by certain historical myths that had perpetuated over time, adding to the belief that full clearance was impossible. One of these myths was that mines
move in peat and would not be found. Most surface layers of peat (0–300 millimeters, or 0–11.81 inches) contain
fibrous peat, or at least semi-fibrous peat, in the topsoil’s
lower parts, with a structure displaying horizontal laminations reflecting the gradual accumulation of little-decomposed plant debris. The large surface area and light
weight of the mine would make it highly unlikely to shift
within the peat and, indeed, the Phase 1 clearance program found no evidence of this. Taking Sapper Hill as
an example of a typical peat minefield, no P4B mine was
found deeper than 120 millimeters (4.72 inches), and 97
percent were at less than 80 millimeters (3.14 inches) or
were located on the surface. The program did conclude,
not surprisingly, that light, plastic anti-personnel mines
can be moved by wind, water or by ground slippage,
particularly when the topography, such as downhill
gradients, was also a factor. Most mines were discovered at their predicted location within the documented
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By the end of the program, all mine signs
were removed from the cleared sites, but the
fences remained around the former minefields
at Surf Bay and Sapper Hill. The fences remained in place not to mark the areas as unsafe,
but to prevent unnecessary damage during the
environmental remediation period and to allow
proper monitoring of the regeneration process.
Conclusion

Surface-laid P4B with lot numbers easily visible and rubber seals
intact.
Photo courtesy of Guy Marot

One key conclusion from this program indicates that further research and development
is necessary to improve the ability of manually detecting minimum-metal mines at greater
depths. The program encountered many physical and philosophical challenges; however, it
was an enormous success. This pilot phase will
undoubtedly inform future projects about the
technical, environmental and logistical challenges associated with clearance in the Falkland Islands, and will provide more accurate
planning data for follow-on phases.
			
see endnotes page

The manually excavated area at Sapper Hill. (Yellow pickets indicate where P4B mines were found.)
Photo courtesy of the author

pattern, but natural forces had moved a very small minority. What is particularly interesting is that the condition of the majority of the mines was very good despite
resting in acidic soil and damp conditions for 28 years,
and we assess that most would certainly have functioned
given the right pressure.
The FI government, concerned about its residual liability in the event of any future incident within the
cleared areas, considered a number of proposals to keep
the fences and some form of warning signs in place after clearance. The DPO made many announcements
through the media to keep the community fully informed of the clearance process, encouraged visits to the
minefields and held briefings to explain the detail and
quality procedures associated with the clearance program. In addition, a public confidence demonstration
was run after the completion of each task site. Following
the last demonstration at Surf Bay, spectators swarmed
onto the cleared area with their children confirming
their confidence in the clearance process.
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Strengthening the Demining 		
Sector Response to HIV/AIDS
		 in Sub-Saharan Africa
In this article, the author explores how HIV/AIDS affects deminers in the African areas
where the disease is most prevalent. He considers how deminers’ lifestyles make them
especially susceptible to HIV/AIDS and suggests mobile HIV/AIDS programs can effectively combat this growing threat.
by Dr. Martin Chitsama [ Demining HIV/AIDS Service Foundation ]

D

emining began in SubSaharan Africa in the
early 1990s, incidentally commencing just a decade after
the HIV/AIDS pandemic started
calling on the human race.1 According to the 2007 and 2009 Landmine Monitor Report and national
mine-action centers in Africa, at
least 50 national and international
demining organizations currently
conduct landmine-clearance operations in Sub-Saharan Africa, collectively employing more than 10,000
deminers.2 Angola's National Demining Institute alone has a contingent of 4,000 deminers organized
into 18 brigades that are demining
across the heavily mined southern
African country.2
Considering that all the African
States Parties to the Ottawa Convention are lagging behind their targets
under Article 5 and are continually
calling for extensions, deminers in
Africa are set to clear landmines on
the continent for many more years.
As reported in 2009 by the Joint
United Nations Programme on HIV/
AIDS (UNAIDS), the region is also
"more heavily affected by HIV and
AIDS than any other region of the

Demining crews always have medical teams onsite. Medics
could be trained to run workplace HIV/AIDS advocacy programs.
All photos courtesy of Joseph Kilino, MDD Handler, VDS Angola

world.” All in all, “an estimated 22.4
million people are living with HIV
in the region—around two thirds of
the global total.”3 As a result, large
numbers of deminers in Africa are
at a significant risk of contracting
HIV/AIDS for many reasons, including worker mobility and extended separation from spouses.
For a deminer, the work-leave cycle provides for limited family time
in a year. There is so much to catch
up on when families reunite after long separation periods that the

question of checking on a spouse's
HIV status is hardly a priority.
The demining-site remoteness
means that deminers are cut off
from mainstream public-health
campaigns, including HIV/AIDS
programs. Health workers fear traveling to suspected-mined regions in
Africa, which also leaves deminers
isolated in terms of outreach programs. Furthermore, deminers are
usually 20 to 49 years old, sexually active and tend to have capital to
spend while interacting with war-
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